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Revisiting the Automation Tax Debate in Light of Covid-19 and Resulting Structural 
Unemployment 
Vincent Ooi - School of Law, Singapore Management University 
-- With the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” that we live in today, the risk of mass displacement 
of human labour is more present. Significant progress in artificial intelligence, robot dexterity, 
processing power and sensor capabilities have reduced costs of automation and enhanced its 
potential benefits. The risk is extremely pertinent for repetitive and menial tasks. 
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, the idea of an automation tax or “robot tax” has been 
debated in several jurisdictions as a response to the increasing adoption of automation 
technologies. These broadly refer to various proposals attempting to tax the use of machines 
that replace human workers. This debate has been considered in greater detail in a piece which 
I co-authored with Glendon Goh, “Taxation of Automation and Artificial Intelligence as a 
Tool of Labour Policy”. The focus of this debate has generally been on finding a balance 
between reaping the benefits to society of increased efficiency and productivity resulting from 
automation and the societal costs of worker displacement and structural unemployment. In the 
context of the current pandemic, as the economy suffers, the need for measures to protect jobs 
is greater than ever.  
As lockdowns ease around the globe and businesses reopen, the threat of jobs being automated 
by machines and workers being displaced as a result has significantly increased. Businesses 
must keep the number of workers on site to a minimum to comply with safe distancing 
measures. Under these constraints while social distancing remains the norm, automation might 
be the way forward for companies that still want to continue production while minimising 
human contact. The threat of a workforce being replaced by robots and automation, a threat 
that has already alarmed the labour movement, is heightened with Covid-19. There will be 
considerable layoffs.  
While a majority of the workforce will be able to continue in their roles after job alteration, for 
instance, through being trained to operate the machines that now perform their old jobs, some 
may not. Structural unemployment results as they lack the necessary skills to perform the 
redesigned job. Mass displacement of human labour results in significant negative exernalities 
to society in terms of the need to support and retrain these displaced workers. To illustrate, 
self-driving vehicles poses a threat to truckers. While there may be a short-term need for truck 
drivers to monitor self-driving vehicles, the technology entails the risk of one day fully 
automating the roles of a human driver. 
An automation tax can potentially be used to correct this market failure. This can be achieved 
by some variation of a Pigouvian tax designed to make the creator of the externality pay for 
causing it. A simple way to implement such an automation tax would be to make companies 
pay a tax for each unit of automation used. The value of the tax could be set as equivalent to 
the costs of the social implications arising from automation, such as unemployment. 
  
 
An ideal automation tax would disincentivise automation that displaces workers by taxing their 
purchase and/or use. The benefits of imposing an automation tax are two-fold. It first aims to 
slow the introduction of automation technology in industries that would otherwise suffer 
massive unemployment as a result of automation. This provides time for governments, welfare 
systems and workers to prepare for the impending effects of structural unemployment. 
Secondly, it serves as tax revenue for the support and re-training of displaced workers. With 
extensive and costly government intervention in light of the Covid-19 pandemic, regulators 
must begin considering how these bills will be paid. Tax-raising strategies may need to be 
implemented.  
The efficiency gains from the adoption of automation technology are undeniably attractive. An 
automation tax remains however a useful tool for specific situations to slow the rate of 
automation, due to its social cost. Thankfully, these cases are likely to be small in number. 
Regulators must take caution to only adopt such policy responses in cases where structural 
unemployment is widespread, irreversible, and clearly attributable to automation. 
Proponents of an automation tax often fail to draw a distinction between different types of 
automation. In some cases, an automation tax is effective in saving jobs. But in other situations 
where automation complements employment, regulators should be cautious about imposing 
such a tax, as this might threaten jobs instead of saving them. Employment-substituting 
technologies that render human workers redundant should be disincentivised. On the other hand, 
employment-complementing technologies used by human workers to enhance their 
productivity, should be incentivised. For example, the use of Computer Assisted Design 
software has enabled workers to perform tasks that would have previously been almost 
impossible. This distinction is crucial and worth bearing in mind when considering the potential 
economic measures to be taken.  
Even if governments do not go as far as to implement an automation tax, the distinction 
between employment-substituting and employment-complementing technologies can be useful 
in guiding policy decisions such as how to support companies in this economic crisis. As 
governments provide generous fiscal stimulus packages designed to help companies survive, 
the impact of these packages on workers should be carefully considered. The aim of preserving 
jobs may not be met if companies use these support measures to invest in employment-
substituting technologies. At a time when preserving jobs is crucial, steps should perhaps be 
taken to ensure that governmental support is not used to displace even more workers.  
Companies that are bailed out with taxpayer money should not be allowed to use these funds 
to buy machines to replace their workers. But we should also make sure that companies have 
enough funds to invest in automation, if this will help to save jobs. Wherever possible, strong 
support should be given to companies investing in employment-complementing technologies 
instead. In this crisis more than ever, we need to safeguard jobs and prevent unemployment. 
Instead of blanket policies to tax automation or bail out companies, governments should 
implement judicious policies to make sure automation complements and supports workers, 
instead of replacing them. 
